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Abstract
Although IPv6 has been the next generation Internet protocol for nearly 15 years, new evidences indicate that
transitioning from IPv4 to IPv6 is about to become a more pressing issue. This paper attempts to quantify if
and how such a transition may unfold. The focus is on "connectivity quality," e.g., as measured by users'
experience when accessing content, as a possible incentive (or disincentive) for migrating to IPv6, and on
"translation costs" (between IPv6 and IPv4) that Internet Service Providers will incur during this transition.
The paper develops a simple model that captures some of the underlying interactions, and highlights the
ambiguous role of translation gateways that can either help or discourage IPv6 adoption. The paper is an initial
foray in the complex and often puzzling issue of migrating the current Internet to a new version with which it
is incompatible.
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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a simple model that explores the ex-
tent to which differences in connectivity quality can be ef-
fective incentives (or disincentives) towards migrating to an
IPv6 Internet. The focus is on “translation” costs that ser-
vice providers will incur if slow adoption of IPv6 persists
in the current IPv4 Internet, while continued growth in the
Internet’s user base increasingly forces the use of IPv6 ad-
dresses for new users. The model elucidates how differences
in connectivity quality, i.e., between native IPv6, native
IPv4, and what is achievable through translation devices or
IPv6↔IPv4 gateways, affect IPv6 adoption in the current
Internet. It highlights how improving native IPv6 connec-
tivity quality, and obviously publicizing that better quality,
may provide sufficient incentives to foster a more rapid mi-
gration to IPv6. It also reveals the often ambiguous role of
gateways that can help or discourage IPv6 adoption. The
paper represents an initial foray in the complex and often
frustrating problem of migrating the current Internet to a
next generation technology with which it is incompatible.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.3 [Network Operation]: Public networks ;
C.2.6 [Internetworking]: Standards
General Terms
Economics, Management, Standardization
Keywords
IPv6, migration, incentives, quality
1. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATIONS
IPv6, the next generation Internet Protocol, was stan-
dardized about fifteen years ago [3] to address a number of
known deficiencies in the current (IPv4) version of the pro-
tocol. In particular, it increased address size from 32 bits
to 128 bits to ensure that as the Internet popularity and
the number of devices connected to it grew, it would not
run out of addresses1 and in the process curtail growth.
In spite of this early standardization and the impending
exhaustion of the IPv4 address pool (various estimators,
e.g., http:/www.potaroo.net/tools/ipv4, put the exhaus-
tion of the address pool of the Internet Assigned Numbers
∗This work was supported by NSF grant CNS-0721610.
1A total of 232 ≈ 4.3 billions addresses may seem plentiful,
but we are fast approaching this limit.
Authority -IANA- to September 2011, and the exhaustion of
the Regional Internet Registry -RIR- pools to about a year
later), IPv6 adoption has been mostly marginal (see [8] or
http://mnlab-ipv6.seas.upenn.edu/monitor/index.html for
how much Internet content is accessible over IPv6).
There are many explanations for this lack of progress
(see [7] for an insightful discussion), including few real in-
centives for IPv6 deployment (it does not really offer any
substantial benefits over IPv4 except for its larger address
space), and until recently limited support for IPv6 in many
end-systems2. Irrespective of the reasons, the slow deploy-
ment of IPv6 means that it now faces a formidable incum-
bent, the current IPv4 Internet, with which it is incompat-
ible3. This in itself represents a significant hurdle for an
eventual migration to an IPv6 Internet. Specifically, even
if we ultimately proceed with assigning IPv6 addresses to
new devices (bridge gap options such as private addresses
have, among others, translation costs that keep rising with
usage), this only accounts for half the issue. In particular, it
does not address the challenge of convincing existing IPv4
devices to also adopt IPv6, i.e., acquire an IPv6 address in
addition to their IPv4 address.
Given the size of the Internet, making the installed IPv4
base, and in particular content, accessible through IPv6 is
critical on multiple accounts. First and foremost, access to
content and other users is what defines the value of the Inter-
net, and because IPv4 and IPv6 are incompatible, an IPv6-
only device, i.e., a device without an IPv4 address, cannot
directly access any device or content that is only reachable
over IPv4. Specifically, an IPv6-only device seeking to con-
nect to a “site” would as usual query the Domain Name
System (DNS) for the IP address associated with the site’s
name, but would do so requesting an address of type AAAA
(quad-A). In the absence of a registered IPv6 address for the
site, DNS would inform the user that the site is unreachable
(over IPv6). IPv6 Internet connectivity is, therefore, of lit-
tle or no value to (IPv6) users without gateways or “trans-
lation” devices, e.g., [5], that provide access to the IPv4
Internet. In other words, the lack of IPv6 adoption in the
current IPv4 Internet mandates the deployment of gateways
to entice new users to accept IPv6. Furthermore, limited
IPv6 adoption in the IPv4 Internet also increases the ca-
pacity requirements and, therefore, costs of those gateways.
This is because the volume of traffic traversing IPv6↔IPv4
2Native IPv6 support only became truly available in the
Windows operating system with the Vista release.
3In hindsight, this is probably the single biggest mistake
made during the specification of IPv6.
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gateways is “proportional” to both the number of IPv6-only
users and the number of IPv4-only (not accessible over IPv6)
sites those users wish to access.
As a result, fostering the adoption of IPv6 in the current
IPv4 Internet is vital to an eventual migration to an IPv6
Internet; something that many see as desirable (see [6] for
a discussion on various alternatives). This is, however, not
without challenges as the many failed efforts to promote or
even mandate4 IPv6 have shown. In particular, IPv6 adop-
tion depends in part on providing the right incentives to
the different stake-holders, i.e., Internet users, Internet ser-
vice providers (ISPs), and Internet content providers (ICPs).
ISPs play an especially critical role as owners of the infras-
tructure connecting Internet users to ICPs. Through pricing
of Internet services, ISPs can influence the adoption of IPv6
by both new and existing (IPv4) Internet users, and con-
versely through tuning the quality differential of the con-
nectivity they offer over IPv6 and IPv4 they may be able
to influence the adoption of IPv6 by ICPs. For example,
Google has made itself accessible over IPv6, but through a
different “service”, i.e., as http://ipv6.google.com and not
the standard http://www.google com, except for users con-
nected to an ISP certified by Google as having good IPv6
connectivity (see http://www.google.com/intl/en/ipv6/).
Our goal in this paper is not to provide a comprehen-
sive investigation of all the possible incentives available for
fostering migration to IPv6. Instead, we focus on how differ-
ences in connectivity quality can influence IPv6 adoption and
the volume of translation traffic that ISPs should provision
for. For that purpose, we develop and analyze a minimal-
ist model that highlights a number of interesting phenomena
that arise as a function of differences in connectivity quality.
We find that gateways can often play an ambiguous role and
can help or discourage IPv6 adoption. Further, we highlight
how improving native IPv6 connectivity quality, and obvi-
ously publicizing that better quality, may provide sufficient
incentives to foster a more rapid migration to IPv6.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
introduces our minimalist model, its notations and the as-
sumptions on which it relies. The model is analyzed and dis-
cussed in Section 3, which in particular demonstrates how
translation traffic can be kept bounded by varying the rela-
tive quality of the different connectivity options. Section 4
summarizes key findings of the model and their implications
for IPv6 adoption, and points to possible extensions to gen-
eralize the model and/or eliminate some of the simplifying
assumptions on which it relies.
2. MODEL AND NOTATION
As alluded to earlier, our model involves three “players”:
users, a service provider (ISP) and content providers (ICPs).
Its goals are to assess how connectivity quality choices made
by the ISP affect IPv6 adoption by ICPs, and consequently
the volume of translation traffic the ISP needs to provision
for. Users access ICPs that derive revenue from users, so
that ICPs make IPv6 adoption decisions based on how the
connectivity quality choices of the ISP affect user access.
Subsection 2.1 details the roles and interactions of the three
players, while Subsection 2.2 articulates the resulting model.
4June 30, 2008 was the deadline set by the US Government’s
Office of Management and Budget for federal agencies to
be running IPv6 [2], and there have been numerous similar
initiatives in other countries as reported in [9].
2.1 Assumptions and Notation
Consider an ISP (more generally a set of ISPs) that be-
cause of shortage of IPv4 addresses has started allocating
IPv6 addresses to new users. Implicit in this choice is a
preference for IPv6 over private IPv4 addresses. As men-
tioned earlier, this is because private addresses incur similar
“translation costs” as IPv6 addresses when connecting to the
public IPv4 Internet, i.e., from a private IPv4 address to a
public one and back, without the possibility of an eventual
migration to a translation-free environment. In other words,
while private addresses may offer short-term benefits, i.e.,
the use of a familiar technology, their long-term costs keep
growing with the size of the Internet. In contrast, IPv6 in-
curs short-term deployment and training costs, but has the
potential for much lower long-term costs. Hence, it can be
argued to be the better option if its long-term benefits can
be realized. Investigating how this can be accomplished is
one of the paper’s motivations. Obviously, in this model the
ISP is also assumed to operate a network that is both IPv4
and IPv6 capable.
The ISP has two categories of users: Existing users that
have been allocated an IPv4 address (and possibly also an
IPv6 address), and new users that only have an IPv6 ad-
dress. Users have no control over the type of IP address they
receive and are not decision makers in the model. In par-
ticular, we ignore possible competition for new users among
ISPs, at least to the extent that all ISPs are assumed to
have run out of IPv4 addresses and to have started allocat-
ing IPv6 addresses to all new users. Alternatively, one may
assume that most users would not have the technical where-
withal to differentiate between an IPv4 or an IPv6 address,
especially if this is “hidden” through the deployment of an
ISP owned access devices.
The main effect of users is their ability to access Internet
content, which as we shall see can drive the IPv6 adoption
decisions of ICPs as well as the connectivity quality options
that the ISP selects. The size of the IPv4 and IPv6 user
populations are denoted as x4 and x6(t), respectively, where
x4 is fixed (the user population when the ISP ran out of IPv4
addresses), and x6(t) is a non-decreasing function of time (t)
with x6(0) = 0. We further assume that x6(t) is an exoge-
nous function so that the growth in the ISP’s user base is
independent of the connectivity quality choices it makes. In
other words and consistent with the above discussion, while
differences in the connectivity quality of IPv6 users may ex-
ist, they are not significant enough to affect user adoption
decisions. In addition to new users that are assigned only
an IPv6 address, a fraction α(t), 0 ≤ α(t) ≤ 1, of existing
x4 IPv4 users is assumed to be also IPv6 accessible, i.e.,
have been assigned an IPv6 address by the ISP in addition
to their IPv4 address. α(t) is a decision variable of the ISP
that controls when to also allocate an IPv6 address to ex-
isting IPv4 users (IPv6 addresses are not scarce and many
user end-systems nowadays support both IPv4 and IPv6).
Users are assumed homogeneous in how they access con-
tent providers (ICPs), and in the amount of traffic they gen-
erate. ICPs are also homogeneous in how users access them
and in the amount of user traffic they sink and source. This
is obviously an over-simplification as ICPs vary in popular-
ity, e.g., [1], which influences traffic volume, but should not
significantly affect our main conclusions, e.g., IPv6 adop-
tion by a popular site is essentially equivalent to adoption
by multiple sites in our simple model. Transition points may
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shift, but general behaviors should remain similar. All ICPs
own an IPv4 address (registered with DNS), and can also
register an IPv6 address to enable IPv6 connectivity. Note
that implicit here is the assumption that all ICPs are IPv6
reachable through the ISP and more generally the Internet5.
For simplicity, the model ignore IPv6-only ICPs (their num-
ber is anyhow marginal). IPv6 users that seek to connect to
IPv4-only ICPs must rely on translation devices such as [5]
(the ISP is responsible for this translation function), while
they can connect natively to ICPs that have registered an
IPv6 address. The fraction of ICPs that have decided to
make themselves accessible over both IPv4 and IPv6 is de-
noted as β(t), 0 ≤ β(t) ≤ 1. As discussed below, the variable
β(t) is endogenous and driven by the IPv6 adoption process
of ICPs.
There are three possible types of network connectivity and
associated quality levels: q44, q64(t) and q66(t). They cor-
respond to the three possible combinations of user and ICP
reachability, namely, IPv4↔IPv4, IPv6↔IPv4, IPv6↔IPv6,
respectively. Connectivity quality of the IPv4 Internet is as-
sumed fixed, i.e., q44 = 1, while connectivity quality through
translation devices, q64(t), and native IPv6 connectivity,
q66(t), can vary with time, e.g., q64(t) can decrease as trans-
lation boxes become more heavily loaded and conversely
q66(t) can improve as technology and skills mature. We as-
sume that q64(t) ≤ q44, i.e., translation can only lower the
quality of accessing content over the IPv4 Internet. How-
ever, there is no such constraint on the quality of IPv6
connectivity, q66(t), that can be better or worse than IPv4
connectivity with or without translation. For example, de-
pending on the capabilities of network devices, better IPv6
quality could be realized in a number of different ways, e.g.,
by giving precedence to IPv6 packets, or allocating a larger
bandwidth share to IPv6 traffic on router interfaces, etc.
The quantities q64(t) and q66(t) are decision variables of the
ISP that is, therefore, assumed to “control” the quality of
the connectivity between users and content providers. This
is clearly a simplifying assumption in the model, as connec-
tivity quality is an end-to-end property that often involves
resources (other ISPs) beyond the control of our target ISP
(or set of ISPs). Our notion of connectivity quality should,
therefore, be viewed as an “average” measure that may also
incorporate limits on how much an individual ISP (or set of
ISPs) can affect its value.
The network provider (ISP) incurs costs that arguably
depend on both the quality of the connectivity it offers and
the volume of traffic it carries. More importantly in the con-
text of this study, it incurs translation costs to allow new
IPv6-only users to connect to content providers (ICPs) that
are accessible only over IPv4. These costs increase with the
volume of translation (IPv6↔IPv4) traffic that needs to be
handled, and are a focus of this paper. In this study, we ig-
nore connectivity costs or assume that they remain approx-
imately constant across connectivity options and instead fo-
cus on translation costs. This is clearly an approximation,
but one that is reasonable given our focus on exploring the
5Although a large number of ASes are still not using
IPv6, many of the largest ISPs are IPv6 enabled, e.g., see
http://bgp.he.net/ipv6-progress-report.cgi, and connectiv-
ity to IPv6 enabled sites is broadly available (in over 6.5
million tests, only 0.13% identified problems for users try-
ing to reach a web site after it became IPv6 reachable, see
http://ipv6test.max.nl).
impact of differences in connectivity quality on IPv6 adop-
tion. Nevertheless, as discussed in Section 4, extending the
model to incorporate a joint optimization of connectivity
quality and translation costs is clearly of interest and a topic
we plan to further investigate.
ICP revenues grow with the number of (IPv4 and IPv6)
users in the network and their “activity” (the traffic they
generate). The network “activity” of users is assumed to be
proportional to the quality q of their network connectivity.
Correspondingly, for a given user population of size x, an
ICP’s revenue is of the general form R ∼ f(qx). As with
the volume of traffic they sink and source, ICPs are assumed
homogeneous in the revenue they derive from users, and for
simplicity we assume R ∼ qx. These revenues are offset
by ICP connectivity costs. The cost component of inter-
est in the context of this paper is the configuration cost for
making themselves accessible to users. This cost depends
on whether they are accessible over IPv4 only, or over both
IPv4 and IPv6, i.e., is of the form c
(i)
4 or c
(i)
4 + c
(i)
6 , respec-
tively, for ICP i. To capture the disparity that exists among
content providers in both awareness about IPv6 and techni-
cal know-how on how to deal with it, the component c
(i)
6 is
heterogeneous across ICPs. This heterogeneity is captured
through a parameter θi, which is taken to be uniformly dis-
tributed between 0 and 1. For simplicity, IPv4 configuration
costs are taken to be constant across ICPs (IPv4 is a mature
technology) and set equal to 0. As a result the configuration
cost of ICP i is c
(i)
4 + c
(i)
6 = 0 + θic6. ICPs will, therefore,
decide on a connectivity option (IPv4 only or both IPv4 and
IPv6) as a function of its cost and how it affects their rev-
enue. This decision process is formalized in the next section.
2.2 Model Formulation
2.2.1 ISP Decision Process and Variables
As stated in the previous section, ISPs’ costs include both
connectivity and translation costs. Because of our focus on
migration issues, we ignore the former and concentrate on
the latter that are assumed proportional to the volume of
translation traffic, which at time t is of the form
T (t) ∼ x6(t) (1− β(t)) (1)
Eq. (1) reflects the dependency of T (t) on the level of IPv6
adoption by ICPs6. The ISP’s decision process involves
choosing connectivity quality options, q64(t) and q66(t), as
well as α(t) (the extent to which existing IPv4 users are also
provided with IPv6 addresses), to maximize profit or min-
imize the amount of translation traffic it needs to handle
(maximize β(t)). Alternatively, as discussed in Section 3.1.2,
the ISP may simply wish to keep translation traffic volume
below a certain value, e.g., so as not to exceed the capacity
of the translation devices it has deployed. In either case, the
ISP’s decisions will be based on how they affect ICPs IPv6
adoption, which we describe next.
2.2.2 ICP Decision Process and Variables
ICPs derive revenues from users accessing them and incur
costs when they decide to become IPv6 accessible. ICPs,
therefore, evaluate connectivity options and select the one
6If all content was accessible over IPv6 (β(t) = 1) there
would be no need for translation; the original assumption
when IPv6 was first standardized.
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with the highest profit (revenue minus cost). We consider
two different models for ICPs’ profits. Model 1 assumes
that IPv6 addresses have precedence over IPv4 addresses,
i.e., if content is accessible over both IPv4 and IPv6, users
that have the option to select either, i.e., the α(t)x4 users
configured with both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, will select
IPv6 connectivity. This is consistent with the default policy
of [4]. Model 2 considers an alternative setting where users
with both IPv4 and IPv6 connectivity select the one that
affords the better quality. This corresponds to a rational
decision process by users or providers of end-user devices7,
based on awareness of quality differentials across connectiv-
ity options. For each model, expressions for ICP i’s profits
under different connectivity options are as follows
Model 1: IPv6 has precedence:
Π
(i)
4 = x4 + q64(t)x6(t) (2)
Π
(i)
46 = x4 (1− α(t)) (3)
+ (α(t)x4 + x6(t)) q66(t)− θic6
Eq. (2) is the ICP profit if it remains only IPv4 accessi-
ble, while Eq. (3) gives its profit once it also becomes IPv6
accessible. Eq. (3) reflects the precedence of IPv6 over IPv4.
Model 2: Quality has precedence:
Π
(i)
4 = x4 + q64(t)x6(t) (4)
Π
(i)
46 = x4 + x6(t)q66(t)− θic6 if q66(t) ≤ 1 (5)
Π
(i)
46 = x4 (1− α(t)) + (α(t)x4 + x6(t)) q66(t) (6)
−θic6 if q66(t) > 1
Eq. (4) is identical to Eq. (2). Eq. (5) gives the ICP profit
once it becomes IPv6 accessible with IPv6 quality lower than
that of IPv4, while Eq. (6) considers the case where IPv6
quality is higher than that of IPv4. In both models, ICP i
decides to become IPv6 accessible only if it yields a higher
profit, i.e., Π
(i)
46 > Π
(i)
4 .
Let δ
(i)
46 (t) denote the variable that reflects the decision of
ICP i to become IPv6 accessible or not, i.e., δ
(i)
46 (t) = 1 if it
does and 0 otherwise. Then under both models, we have
δ
(i)
46 (t) =

1 , if Π
(i)
4 < Π
(i)
46
0 , otherwise
(7)
3. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
3.1 Model 1 – IPv6 has Precedence
3.1.1 ICP IPv6 Adoption
From Eqs. (2), (3), and (7), together with the assumption
that θi is uniformly distributed in [0, 1], we get the following
expression for the level β(t) of IPv6 adoption by ICPs
β(t) =
„
α(t)x4(q66(t)− 1) + x6(t)(q66(t)− q64(t))
c6
«
[0,1]
, (8)
7If IPv6 quality is well-known to be poor, providers of op-
erating systems may ship them configured to always prefer
IPv4 whenever there is a choice, or conversely system ad-
ministrators may choose this as the default configuration
for systems they manage.
where we have used the notation (x)[0,1] to indicate the
projection of x on the interval [0, 1].
Eq. (8) provides intuitive confirmation of the impact of
different parameters on IPv6 adoption by ICPs.
The first intuitive finding from Eq. (8), is the fact that
without quality differentials IPv6 adoption may never take
off, i.e., ∀t β(t) = 0 if q64(t) = q66(t) = q44 = 1.
Another finding is that IPv6 adoption grows the better the
quality of native IPv6 connectivity (q66), but remains at 0
unless IPv6 affords better performance than what is achiev-
able from going through translation devices, i.e., β = 0 if
q66 ≤ q64 ≤ 1. That is, no ICP will adopt IPv6 if translation
quality is better than native IPv6 quality. This represents
somewhat of a dilemma for ISPs, which may struggle with
their early IPv6 deployment, i.e., q66(t) is likely to initially
be less than q44 = 1, while providing reasonable translation
quality, i.e., q64(t) ≈ q44 = 1, may at first be relatively
easy as translation traffic volume (1−β(t))x6(t) will be low.
There will, therefore, be no adoption of IPv6 by ICPs until
IPv6 connectivity quality surpasses that of translation. At
this point, some ICPs become incentivized to adopt IPv6,
i.e., Π
(i)
46 > Π
(i)
4 for some i.
Additionally, if IPv6 connectivity is no better than IPv4
connectivity, i.e., q66 ≤ q44 = 1, it is harmful to ICP IPv6
adoption to start providing existing IPv4 users with IPv6
addresses, i.e., increasing α(t) results in lower IPv6 adop-
tion (smaller β values) by ICPs. This is due to Model 1’s
assumption that users with both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses
give precedence to IPv6 access when that option is avail-
able. This forces users with IPv4 and IPv6 addresses to
connect to IPv6 accessible sites using IPv6, and in the pro-
cess experience lower quality than if they had used IPv4.
This represents a disincentive for ICPs to become IPv6 ac-
cessible, in spite of the fact that IPv6 offers IPv6-only users
better connectivity quality than what they experience with
translation devices. Specifically, no ICP chooses to become
IPv6 accessible, i.e., β(t) = 0, if
α(t) ≥ x6(t) (q66(t)− q64(t))
x4 (1− q66(t)) and q66(t) < 1
As a result, the ISP’s best strategy to maximize IPv6 adop-
tion is to avoid enabling IPv6 access for existing IPv4 users,
i.e., keep α(t) = 0, if q66 ≤ 1. Conversely, when IPv6 con-
nectivity becomes better than IPv4 connectivity, making ex-
isting IPv4 users accessible over IPv6 becomes beneficial to
ICP IPv6 adoption, which grows with α(t). In general, IPv6
adoption by ICPs, β(t), is of the form
β(t) =
8><>:
0, if q66(t) < q64(t) ≤ 1 (a)“
α(t)x4(q66(t)−1)+x6(t)(q66(t)−q64(t))
c6
”
[0,1]
otherwise (b)
(9)
The main (intuitive) findings from the above discussion
are summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 IPv6 adoption by Internet Content Providers
(ICPs) is influenced as follows by differences in the levels of
IPv4 and IPv6 connectivity quality
• ICPs will not be incented to become IPv6 accessible as
long as IPv6 connectivity is no better than what trans-
lation devices offer, i.e., β(t) = 0, if q66(t) ≤ q64(t);
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• IPv6 adoption by ICPs will grow with the number of
IPv6-only users as soon as IPv6 connectivity quality
exceeds that of translation devices, i.e., ∂β
∂x6
> 0 if
q66(t) > q64(t);
• As long as IPv6 connectivity is not equal to or better
than IPv4 connectivity, it is best not to allow existing
IPv4 users the option of accessing content over IPv6,
i.e., ∂β
∂α
< 0 if q66(t) < 1;
• Conversely, once IPv6 quality exceeds that of the IPv4
Internet, IPv6 adoption by ICPs will benefit from mak-
ing existing IPv4 users IPv6 enabled, i.e., ∂β
∂α
> 0 if
q66(t) > 1.
3.1.2 Managing Translation Traffic Growth
Another aspect of interest is the volume of translation
traffic that an ISP needs to deal with, and therefore pro-
vision for. Using Eqs. (1) and (9), we can investigate the
effect of different strategies on this quantity.
Consider a scenario in which the ISP has deployed trans-
lation devices that have an aggregate capacity of a. The
ISP is then interested in exploring means to keep transla-
tion traffic below that value even as the number of new IPv6
users, x6(t), increases. In other words, can the ISP “control”
the volume of translation traffic through its three decision
variables, α(t), q64(t), and q66(t), knowing how they affect
ICPs’ decisions as predicted by Eq. (9). Note that this con-
trol is indirect, i.e., through its influence on ICP decisions,
and is not based on throttling or rate-limiting the amount of
translation traffic that IPv6 users originate. This is control
at the time-scale of provisioning, when the ISP determines
if and by how much to upgrade its translation capacity.
The volume of translation traffic can be obtained from
combining Eq. (1) and Eq. (9). Following Eqs. (9)(a) and (b),
we consider three distinct configurations.
I. q66(t) < q64(t) ≤ 1.
From Eq. (9) this results in β(t) = 0, i.e., no ICPs make
themselves IPv6 accessible. Translation traffic volume is,
therefore, directly proportional to the number of new IPv6
users, x6(t), and the number of existing IPv4 users to which
the ISP has also provided an IPv6 address, α(t)x4. As a re-
sult, if the ISP is unable to provide IPv6 connectivity quality
that is better than what is achievable through translation,
its only option to keep the volume of translation traffic be-
low a is simply to ensure that the total (to all ICPs) com-
bined traffic from new IPv6 users (x6(t)) and existing IPv4
users that have been provided with an IPv6 address (α(t)x4)
does not exceed a. Obviously, this is best achieved by not
configuring IPv6 addresses on any existing IPv4 users, i.e.,
by setting α(t) = 0, and remains feasible as long as there
are not too many new IPv6 users (x6(t) ≤ a). As soon as
the traffic from new IPv6 users exceeds a, i.e., x6(t) > a,
the ISP has no choice but to improve IPv6 quality to keep
translation traffic volume below a.
In other words, in Configuration I, the ISP’s best strat-
egy is to set α(t) = 0, but the strategy is viable, i.e., ensures
T (t) ≤ a, only as long x6(t) ≤ a.
The next configuration considers the case where the ISP
has improved IPv6 connectivity quality beyond that achiev-
able through translation, but not yet so that it surpasses
IPv4 quality, i.e., q64(t) ≤ q66(t) < q44 = 1.
II. q64(t) ≤ q66(t) < 1.
As in the previous scenario, the ISP’s best strategy to
minimize translation traffic volume is to set α(t) = 0. As
discussed in the context of Eq. (8), this is because as long
as the quantity (q66(t) − 1) is negative, allowing existing
IPv4 users native IPv6 access has a negative effect on β(t).
Increasing α(t), therefore, contributes additional translation
traffic.
There are, however, additional conditions that need to
be satisfied to keep translation traffic volume below a when
x6(t) > a. In particular, IPv6 connectivity, q66(t), needs to
exceed translation quality, q64(t), by a certain margin. We
explore this issue next.
From Eq. (9) and assuming q64(t) ≤ q66(t) < 1 (and
α(t) = 0), ensuring T (t) ≤ a yields the following relation
between q66(t) and q64(t):
q66(t) ≥ q64(t) + c6
x6(t)
„
1− a
x6(t)
«
. (10)
For a given value of q64(t), the right-hand-side of Eq. (10) is
easily found to have a maximum for x6(t) = 2a, which based
on Eq. (1) is also where translation traffic peaks (at a value
of a). Hence, to keep translation traffic below a for all values
of x6(t), IPv6 quality must be better than a minimum value
qmin66 (t) that satisfies.
qmin66 (t) = q64(t) +
c6
4a
. (11)
As expected, qmin66 (t) grows with c6, the cost of IPv6 configu-
ration for ICPs, and decreases with the provisioned capacity
of translation devices a. When combined with Eq. (9) and
keeping α(t) = 0, Eq. (11) also tells us that if q66(t) ≥
qmin66 (t), all ICPs will have become IPv6 accessible (the IPv4
Internet will have fully migrated to IPv6) once x6(t) = 4a.
From Eq. (11), we see that for the ISP to be able to main-
tain T (t) ≤ a as the IPv6 user base grows without making
IPv6 quality better than that of IPv4, i.e., remain in Con-
figuration II, translation quality must satisfy
q64 < 1− c6
4a
. (12)
The low translation quality is then sufficient to entice more
ICPs to become IPv6 accessible as the number of IPv6 users
increases. As before, it is best to set α(t) = 0 to avoid disin-
centives associated with worsening connectivity quality for
IPv4 users that also have an IPv6 address, i.e., because
q66(t) < 1. How low translation quality needs to be depends
on the ratio c6
4a
, and too low a translation quality may neg-
atively affect the demand for IPv6, i.e., x6(t); a factor that
the current model does not account for.
It may, therefore, not always be possible to keep trans-
lation quality low enough, i.e., we may need to have q64 ≥
1− c6
4a
. Exploring this scenario is what we consider next. In
particular, because keeping translation traffic below a will
then at some point require improving IPv6 quality beyond
that of IPv4 (or alternatively upgrade translation capacity
to a′ > a so that Eq. (12) is now satisfied), it is of interest to
determine when this happens, i.e., for what value of x6(t).
Combining the condition q66(t) < 1 with Eq. (10) yields
the following inequality
(1− q64)x26 − c6x6 + ac6 > 0 . (13)
When q64 ≥ 1 − c64a , Eq. (13) has two real-valued roots of
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the form
x
(1)
6 =
c6 −
p
c26 − 4ac6(1− q64)
2(1− q64) (14)
x
(2)
6 =
c6 +
p
c26 − 4ac6(1− q64)
2(1− q64) (15)
As q64 varies in the range (1 − c64a , 1), the first root varies
from 2a− down to a+, while the second root varies from 2a+
to∞. Furthermore, f(x) is negative in the range (x(1)6 , x(2)6 )
and positive outside. This implies that Eq. (10) is satis-
fied only in the range x6(t) ∈ [a, x(1)6 ). When x6(t) exceeds
x
(1)
6 , it becomes necessary for IPv6 quality to exceed that of
IPv4, i.e., q66(t) ≥ 1, to ensure that the volume of transla-
tion traffic remains below a. In other words, better transla-
tion quality (q64 ≥ 1− c64a ) delays IPv6 adoption by ICPs to
the extent that IPv6 quality needs to improve beyond that
of IPv4 to keep the translation traffic below a. This tran-
sitions occurs when the number of IPv6-only users, x6(t),
reaches x
(1)
6 , with that value decreasing from 2a to a as
translation quality approaches IPv4 quality. Consequently,
full IPv6 adoption by ICPs (β(t) = 1) will also not happen
until after that transition has occurred. Investigating when
this happens is addressed in Configuration III, where we
explore the impact of improved IPv6 connectivity on both
translation traffic volume and full IPv6 adoption.
III. q66(t) ≥ 1.
From Eq. (1) an Eq. (9)(b), we obtain the following con-
dition to ensure T (t) ≤ a
(q66 − q64)x26 − (c6 − αx4(q66 − 1))x6 + ac6 ≥ 0 , (16)
where for ease of notation we omitted dependency on t.
Because we are in the regime q66(t) ≥ 1, i.e., IPv6 quality
has been improved beyond that of the current IPv4 Internet,
we want to identify conditions under which this is sufficient
to always keep translation traffic volume below a. Eq. (16)
implies that this requires
q66(t) ≥ q64(t)x
2
6(t) + (c6 + α(t)x4)x6(t)− ac6
x26(t) + α(t)x4x6(t)
(17)
Note that when α(t) = 0, Eq. (17) simplifies to
q66(t) ≥ q64(t) + c6
4a
(18)
This is consistent with Eq. (11), and restates that when
no existing IPv4 users are capable of accessing IPv6 content
natively, ensuring that IPv6 connectivity quality exceeds the
threshold of Eq. (18) is sufficient to ensure that translation
traffic always remains below a. As expected, this threshold
is higher when c6 is high (high migration costs for ICPs) and
a is low (limited translation capacity).
Conversely, we easily see from Eq. (17) that increasing
α(t) allows the inequality to be met with a smaller value of
q66(t) for all x6(t). In other words, when IPv6 connectiv-
ity quality is better than that of IPv4, making more IPv4
users IPv6 capable is beneficial to keeping the volume of
translation traffic low. More generally, from Eq. (17) we
can compute the value of x∗6(t) for which q66(t) realizes its
maximum value, namely
x∗6(t) =
ac6 +
q
a2c26 + ac6α(t)x4 [c6 + α(t)x4(1− q64(t))]
c6 + α(t)x4(1− q64(t))
(19)
The specific expression for x∗6(t) of Eq. (19) does not add
new insight, but it is worth noting that once x6(t) exceeds
x∗6(t), it is possible for q66(t) to start decreasing again with-
out risking to increase translation traffic beyond a. As a
matter of fact, it is even possible, although obviously not
necessarily practical or desirable, to lower IPv6 quality back
below that of IPv4 (but not below that of translation de-
vices). This is because once the IPv6 user base is large
enough, this alone is sufficient to entice most ICPs to be-
come IPv6 accessible even if connectivity quality is lower
than with IPv4 (but better than what would be realized by
going through translation devices). An illustration of this
possibility is provided in Fig. 3.
The main findings from the above discussion are summa-
rized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 ISPs can control the volume of IPv6 traffic
that undergoes translation (to IPv4) by adjusting the relative
connectivity quality of IPv6 and translation compared to that
of IPv4. Some of the trade-offs this involves are as follows
• If an ISP is unable to offer IPv6 connectivity quality
that is better than what it offers through translation,
translation traffic volume will keep increasing to even-
tually exceed any provisioned translation capacity, i.e.,
limx6→∞ T (t) =∞ if q66(t) ≤ q64(t).
• If translation quality is low enough, it is possible to
keep the volume of translation traffic below a certain
threshold without ever making IPv6 connectivity qual-
ity better than that of IPv4.
• Conversely, if translation quality is too close to that of
the current IPv4 connectivity and translation capacity
is limited, it is eventually necessary for IPv6 connec-
tivity quality to exceed that of IPv4 to keep the volume
of translation traffic below capacity.
• Once IPv6 connectivity quality exceeds that of IPv4,
increasing the number of IPv4 users that are IPv6 en-
abled has a positive impact on keeping translation traf-
fic volume bounded. In particular, once a sufficient
number of IPv4 users are IPv6 accessible, both up-
per bounding translation traffic and eventually ensur-
ing complete migration to IPv6 can be realized with
IPv6 quality equal but no better than IPv4 quality.
• Conversely, once IPv6 penetration has reached a cer-
tain level (either by making IPv4 users IPv6 accessible
or through growth of the population of IPv6 users), it is
possible to reduce IPv6 connectivity quality below that
of IPv4 (but above that of translation) while still keep-
ing translation traffic bounded.
3.2 Model 2 – Connectivity Quality has Prece-
dence
In this section, we briefly consider Model 2, where IPv4
users with IPv6 addresses are selective enough to enable
IPv6 connectivity only when it offers higher quality, i.e.,
q66(t) > 1. Because the main results of Section 3.1.2 are
mostly insensitive8 to the differences between Models 1 and 2,
we only explore how IPv6 adoption (by ICPs) is affected by
the assumptions of Model 2.
8This is because we assume the ISP would realize the neg-
ative effect of providing existing IPv4 users with IPv6 con-
nectivity when q66(t) < 1, and would therefore set α(t) = 0.
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3.2.1 ICP IPv6 Adoption
The main difference with the scenario of Model 1 is the ab-
sence of IPv6 adoption disincentives associated with a posi-
tive α(t), when IPv6 connectivity if worse than that of IPv4.
From Eqs. (4), (6), and (7), together with the assumption
that the θi are uniformly distributed in [0, 1], we can again
characterize β(t), the level of IPv6 adoption by ICPs,
β(t) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if q66(t) < q64(t) < 1 (a)“
x6(t)(q66(t)−q64(t))
c6
”
[0,1]
if q64(t) ≤ q66(t) < 1 (b)“
x6(t)(q66(t)−q64(t))+α(t)x4(q66(t)−1)
c6
”
[0,1]
otherwise (c)
(20)
Eqs. (20) and (9) differ only in Eq. (20)(b) that accounts for
the fact that IPv4 users with IPv6 addresses will not select
IPv6 connectivity unless it offers better quality. As a result,
there is no negative impact of the ISP’s choice of α(t) > 0 on
ICP IPv6 adoption decisions in this configuration. All the
findings of Proposition 1 remain therefore valid, except for
those related to providing existing IPv4 users with an IPv6
address when IPv6 quality is worse than that of IPv4. This
is summarized in the mostly self-evident next proposition.
Proposition 3 When users configured with both IPv4 and
IPv6 addresses are able to select the connectivity option wit
the highest quality, increasing the number of such users has
no negative impact on the decision by ICPs to become IPv6
accessible. However, for such an increase to have a positive
effect on ICPs IPv6 adoption, the quality of IPv6 connectiv-
ity must be higher than that of the current IPv4 Internet.
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Figure 1: Impact of IPv6 Quality on Translation
Traffic Volume (q64 = 0.74).
3.3 Numerical Examples
This section provides a few representative illustrations of
the paper’s findings. It assumes x4 = 1, i.e., the number
and traffic of IPv4 users is normalized to 1, and a = 0.1
and c6 = 0.1. In other words, translation devices have been
provisioned to handle a traffic volume equal to 10% of the
current IP4 traffic, and the cost of IPv6 provisioning is in the
worst case (θi = 1) equal to 10% of an ICP’s revenue. Given
these values, we consider two possible translation quality
values, q64 = 0.74 and 0.79, where the first value satisfies
Eq. (12), namely, q64 = 0.74 < 1− c64a = 0.75, but the latter
doesn’t. The impact of this difference is illustrated by com-
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Figure 2: Impact of IPv6 Quality on Translation
Traffic Volume (q64 = 0.79).
paring Figs. 1 and 2, with the former exhibiting consistently
lower volumes of translation traffic. Additionally, Fig. 1 also
shows that as indicated by Eq. (11), it is possible to keep
T (t) ≤ a = 0.1 with an IPv6 quality no better than that of
IPv4 (Eq. (11) states that qmin66 = q64 + 1 − c64a = 0.99 and
the figure plots translation traffic for q66 = 1). Figs. 1 and 2
also illustrate that improving translation quality calls for
improving IPv6 quality if one is to keep translation traffic
below the provisioned capacity. A similar conclusion applies
to ensuring full migration of the IPv4 Internet to IPv6, e.g.,
when q64 = 0.74, β reaches 1 for x6 = 1.67 and q66 = 0.8,
but increasing q64 to 0.79 calls for correspondingly increas-
ing q66 to 0.85 to achieve the same result.
Another perspective on the impact of q64 on q66 is il-
lustrated in Fig. 3 that plots as a function of the number
of IPv6 users, the minimum required IPv6 quality to keep
T (t) ≤ a = 0.1. The figure also shows that once the number
of IPv6 users exceeds the value of Eq. (19), it is possible
to decrease IPv6 quality, even below that of IPv4, without
risking exceeding the capacity of translation devices.
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Figure 3: Minimum IPv6 Quality to Keep Transla-
tion Traffic Volume Below Provisioned Capacity.
4. CONCLUSION
This paper used a simple model to explore how quality
and capacity of translation devices and IPv6 quality could
affect both migration of the IPv4 Internet to IPv6, and the
volume of traffic that translation devices need to handle.
In spite of its simplicity and obvious limitations, the model
helped elucidate a number of interesting issues, and in par-
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ticular the often ambiguous role of translation devices. Those
devices are mandatory to let IPv6 users access the current
Internet that is accessible mostly only over IPv4, and their
quality needs to be high enough to satisfy those users. On
the other hand, if their quality is too high, it will likely slow
down an eventual migration to IPv6. Another more intuitive
finding is the role of IPv6 connectivity quality. In particular,
if IPv6 quality remains below what is achievable through
translation, migration to IPv6 will not occur and the vol-
ume of translation traffic will keep growing. Additionally, if
translation quality is high enough, e.g., as may be required
to entice users to initially accept IPv6, it may be necessary
to improve IPv6 quality beyond that of the current IPv4
Internet, if one is to keep translation traffic volume below
the provisioned capacity of translation devices. Conversely,
increasing the capacity of those devices can facilitate mi-
gration to IPv6 without requiring that IPv6 quality exceeds
that of IPv4.
The model also established the potentially significant ben-
efits that ISPs can derive from making IPv6 connectivity
quality better than that of the current IPv4 Internet, at
least initially when IPv6 adoption by ICPs is low. A high-
quality IPv6 Internet, and obviously publicizing this higher
quality, will entice ICPs to make themselves IPv6 accessi-
ble and keep translation traffic low. The resulting savings
will likely offset costs incurred in improving IPv6 quality.
In other words, the higher the initial quality of IPv6, the
earlier ICPs are likely to become IPv6 accessible9 without
waiting for x6(t) to be large. This will in turn ensure that
the volume of translation traffic remains small.
This being said, there are clearly challenges in translat-
ing this into reality, the least of which is the nature of the
Internet that is made-up of a collection of interconnected
autonomous entities. The failure of a few of them to offer
high-quality IPv6 connectivity could affect end-to-end IPv6
quality for many users and ICPs. On the other hand, if the
larger ISPs, which to some extent stand to gain the most
from a faster migration to IPv6, lead the way in offering
high(er) quality IPv6 connectivity, this may be sufficient in-
centive (the corresponding user base is large) for many ICPs
to consider making themselves IPv6 accessible.
There are obviously many extensions one could consider
to make the simple model used in this paper more realis-
tic. For example, one aspect that the current model ignores
is how competition among ICPs and possibly ISPs might
affect IPv6 adoption decisions. Other extensions of inter-
est include allowing heterogeneity in content popularity and
revenues as well as in connectivity quality. Clearly, the con-
version to IPv6 of a highly popular web site has a larger
impact on translation traffic volume than that of a less pop-
ular site. This will introduce differences, although we don’t
expect them to drastically affect the findings of the simple
model, e.g., the adoption of IPv6 by a popular site is akin
similar adoption decisions by several less popular sites. Sim-
ilarly, the notion of a single quality value for all users and
ICPs is clearly an over-simplification, as users experience
different levels of connectivity quality when accessing differ-
ent ICPs, and conversely different users often see different
connectivity quality when accessing the same ICP. Explor-
ing models that allow such heterogeneity may be of interest,
even if as with ICP heterogeneity we expect the main find-
9This obviously reflects the growth of ICP revenues with
user activity, which itself grows with network quality.
ings of our simple model to remain mostly valid, e.g., based
on an “average” measure of quality.
Another extension of interest, and one that we plan to
actively pursue is to minimize the model’s reliance on ex-
ogenous parameters, and in particular include users among
the decision makers, i.e., endogenize x6(t) by making it a
function of the connectivity quality that new users expe-
rience. Additionally, it is of interest to capture more ac-
curately the tension between translation costs and connec-
tivity costs, i.e., account for the fact that improving IPv6
connectivity quality is likely to come at a cost. Our goal
is to formulate a joint optimization that will incorporate
both cost components and seek to characterize the strategy
that yields the lowest overall cost. Finally, validating the pa-
per’s findings is another worthwhile endeavor, and one of the
motivations behind the previously mentioned measurement
efforts whose partial results are available at http://mnlab-
ipv6.seas.upenn.edu/monitor/index.html.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to acknowledge A. Durand’s inputs
on characteristics and limitations of translation devices, which
helped crystallize the paper’s focus. They would also like to
thank B. Edelman for insightful comments on an early ver-
sion of the paper. Finally, they would like to acknowledge
the role of the WIE’09 Workshop10 in initiating discussions
that in part motivated the paper.
5. REFERENCES
[1] Alexa Top Web Sites. Available at
http://www.alexa.com/topsites.
[2] K. Das. US Government using IPv6. Available at
http://ipv6.com/articles/general/
US Government IPv6.htm.
[3] S. Deering and R. Hinden. Internet Protocol, version 6
(IPv6) specification. RFC 1883, December 1995.
[4] R. Draves. Default address selection for Internet
Protocol version 6 (IPv6). RFC 3484, February 2003.
[5] A. Durand, Ed. Dual-stack lite broadband deployments
post IPv4 exhaustion. Internet Draft
(draft-ietf-softwire-dual-stack-lite-02), October 2009.
(Work in progress).
[6] B. Edelman. Running out of numbers: Scarcity of IP
addresses and what to do about it. In Proc. First
Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and
Their Applications. Springer-Verlag’s Lecture Notes of
the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics
and Telecommunications Engineering, 2009.
[7] G. Huston. Is the transition to IPv6 a “market
failure”? Available at
http://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/2009-09/v6trans.html,
September 2009.
[8] C. Labovitz. The end is near, but is IPv6? Available at
http://asert.arbornetworks.com/
2008/08/the-end-is-near-but-is-ipv6/, August 2008.
[9] Technical and economic assessment of Internet Protocol
version 6 (IPv6). US Department of Commerce -
Available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/ntiageneral/
ipv6/final/ipv6final.pdf, January 2006.
10See http://www.caida.org/workshops/wie/0909/.
8
